I have to admit to being highly suspicious of private treaties - especially those from buyer-developers who don't put in a bid at the public tender. After the shenanigans that went on in round 1 (please read the transcripts) who would ever trust that particular route ever again! In round 1, the sale was thrown out because it was not done in good faith with regard to sale price, - and what went on out of owners' view was totally shocking.
The question is, do you want real transparency or just lip-service to transparency?
In government land sales, there are no private treaties , their policy is public tender only. A public tender is totally transparent and developer-buyers are pitched agianst one another. Their reserve price is also kept secret.** As a result, their tenders attract many bidders. In an en bloc, the reserve price is never secret - it is known to everyone everywhere The moment you allow private treaties after a public tender then you automatically REDUCE the number of tender bids. You will be lucky to get one or two.
Without doubt, PUBLIC TENDERS - WITH NO POSSIBILITY OF PRIVATE TREATY - ATTRACT THE MOST INTEREST.
Recent example:
The winning bid for the Bishan site suggests that the developer is looking to sell the units at around S$1,400 psf.”.
It is in the public interest that public tenders be held; the collective interest is also best served through a public tender.
The owners should request that the estate be sold through public tender only. Owners have nothing to lose by this and everything to gain. Force the interested buyers to make their bids public and they will have no choice but to do so. If they bid close to the RP they may fail - that is the beauty of tendering.
Allowing developer-buyers the option of holding back and putting in a bid AFTER the tender just guarantees an empty tender exercise and a private offer close to the RP (already published in the media for heavens sake!!!).
The question is, do you want real transparency or just lip-service to transparency?
In government land sales, there are no private treaties , their policy is public tender only. A public tender is totally transparent and developer-buyers are pitched agianst one another. Their reserve price is also kept secret.** As a result, their tenders attract many bidders. In an en bloc, the reserve price is never secret - it is known to everyone everywhere The moment you allow private treaties after a public tender then you automatically REDUCE the number of tender bids. You will be lucky to get one or two.
Without doubt, PUBLIC TENDERS - WITH NO POSSIBILITY OF PRIVATE TREATY - ATTRACT THE MOST INTEREST.
Recent example:
CapitaLand tops record 19 bids for Bishan site
A 99-year leasehold land site for condominium housing in Bishan attracted a record 19 bids at the close of its tender by the Housing and Development Board yesterday – the highest number of bids in 12 years.
This is one bid higher than the Simei Street 3 tender in May last year. That site has since been developed into the My Manhattan by CEL Development.
The highest bid for the Bishan site came from CapitaLand at S$550.1 million, or $869 per sq ft per plot ratio, submitted through its wholly-owned subsidiary Bishan Residential Development.
It is in the public interest that public tenders be held; the collective interest is also best served through a public tender.
The owners should request that the estate be sold through public tender only. Owners have nothing to lose by this and everything to gain. Force the interested buyers to make their bids public and they will have no choice but to do so. If they bid close to the RP they may fail - that is the beauty of tendering.
Allowing developer-buyers the option of holding back and putting in a bid AFTER the tender just guarantees an empty tender exercise and a private offer close to the RP (already published in the media for heavens sake!!!).
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The LTSA rules favour private treaties in that they allow the SC to enter into binding contracts without prior consultation with the majority owners. An owner meeting (only with no voting ) to consider the sale is either after the public tender or after the private S&P has been entered into.
Why are private treaties treated differently from public tenders? What rational dictates that a SC informs the owners with tender bids ......but not with a private treaty offer?
Because it is NOT TRANSPARENT and owners can be easily conned, that is why.
Why are private treaties treated differently from public tenders? What rational dictates that a SC informs the owners with tender bids ......but not with a private treaty offer?
Because it is NOT TRANSPARENT and owners can be easily conned, that is why.
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Why would an interested developer decide not to participate in the tender exercise?
- With few or no bids, the owners might feel their estate has drawn little interest, while in reality, the interested party is waiting on the sidelines to come in to 'save the day' with a near RP price.
- With few or no public bids, the owners will feel their SC is justified in taking what they can get from a private offer.
- In a tender, it is the SC who call the shots; set the dates and deadlines. In a private offer. the shoe is on the other foot and it is the developer who calls the shots and deadlines eg 'sign by midnight or the deal is off'.
- Perhaps the developer wants to see the public bids first (if any) before delivering their counter offer.
- They avoid having their offer scrutinised by the majority who might feel other bids have more favourable conditions. If the meeting is held after the public tender then the private offer isn't even on the table yet.
- The SC can sign the private treaty unilaterally (if the CSA mandates them to do so, which is usually the case) and if the majority are subsequently unhappy, they can do nothing about it. It is only the minority who can bring the matter up to the STB and High Court.
- Couple this with a 'Venus Fly Trap' kind of clause (see my CSA post ) and it's a slam dunk for the buyer.
- Perhaps the estate has been 'promised' to the said developer beforehand and the SC are just going through the formalities by holding a public tender, rejecting the bids/ counter offers, lamenting the poor response, proclaiming that all is lost etc...before suddenly introducing the saving private party with the RP (or possibly even lower) offer.
- Perhaps the developer has come to some informal side-agreement with the SC to buy the estate at near the RP at the beginning- who knows, framed from the outset... as I say, it's all very fishy to me.
One of the Duties of the Sale Committee is the duty to obtain the best price:-
154 The duty to obtain the best price arises out of the SC’s duty to act conscientiously as well as to act even-handedly in the collective interest of all the subsidiary proprietors. The duty to obtain the best sale price is particularly crucial for the objecting subsidiary proprietors. As alluded to at [114] above, such subsidiary proprietors may be compelled by virtue of an STB order to sell their units either at a price which they were not prepared to accept or where they were in fact not prepared to sell their units at any price for personal reasons. In such circumstances, their only consolation or compensation for losing their units is the sale price they will receive. The SC must therefore strive to achieve the best premium available for the subsidiary proprietors by obtaining the best price for the development as a whole.
Horizon Towers Appellate Court decision, Andre Phang Boon Leong JA, Chan Sek Keong CJ, V K Rajah JA
** The procedure seems to be different for land sales on the reserve list whereby a site on the Reserve List System will be put up for sale if a developer's indicated minimum price in his application is acceptable to the Government. This minimum price is made known to the public but the developer's name is not.
Confusing... why have 2 different systems?










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